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Introduction
The recent Ninth Circuit decision in Perry v. Schwarzenegger1 marked a pivotal step forward for the gay rights movement. The
decision is the first time a federal court has held that there is a right to same-sex marriage under the United States Constitution.
Applying strict scrutiny,2 Judge Vaughn Walker found that Proposition 8's ban on same-sex marriage violated both substantive
due process3 and equal protection (on the basis of sex and sexual orientation).4 While the constitutional merits of this decision
are of great interest, I will leave such analysis to other scholars.5 Instead, I believe much can be gained by looking beneath the
legal logic of the ruling, to the ideological paradigms that operate below the surface. By ideological paradigms, I do not mean
merely the personal opinions of  *59  Judge Walker, but the larger societal attitudes and assumptions that manifest themselves
within the text. Through a close reading of the opinion, I will examine the ways in which these ideologies interact and converge
in often unexpected ways. In particular, I will track the ideological strands inherent in the concept of “status” and the ways in
which that single word functions as the driving force behind the entire opinion.
Within the text of Perry, the word “status” is overloaded with ideological meanings, signifying at least three different concepts.
First, status is drawn from classical legal theory as one-half of the status/contract dyad. Second, status plays a role in the politics
of queer identity within the status/conduct dyad. In describing the significance of same-sex marriage, Perry draws on both of
these paradigms and imbues the status half of both dyads with a sense of normative desirability, even superiority. As the opinion
reaches this normative conclusion, it engages with the third meaning of status: status as rank or social status. The interactions
between and among these different constructions of status undergird the legal conclusions and ultimately create value in status
qua status. Within this discourse, status (rank) is correlated with inclusion in the status half of each dyad--social status is
achieved once both marriage and sexual orientation are constituted as falling within the status half of their respective dyads.
In discussing the status/contract and status/conduct dyads, I do not mean to imply that these pairs are natural or innate opposites.
Nor do I intend to convey that either of the terms is normatively superior in comparison to the other. Both dyads are cultural
constructs, convenient ideological lenses with which to view and classify the world. My goal in this paper is merely to show
the ways in which Perry builds upon these ideologies of status and enshrines status in all its forms. In Part I, I will discuss
the status/contract dyad and the way in which the opinion moves counter to the dominant narrative that law (and marriage in
particular) is moving away from status to contract. Part II contains an analysis of status as rank and the way in which legal
status is closely entwined with conceptions of rank and power. In Part III, I turn to the status/conduct dyad and the way in which
Perry disclaims constructivism in favor of a theory of weak essentialism. I conclude by arguing that these moves toward status,
while counter to popular ideological narratives, are instrumental to the ultimate holding that Proposition 8 is unconstitutional
on both substantive due process and equal protection grounds.CONSTITUTING STATUS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE..., 33 Women's Rts. L....
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*60  Part I--The Status/Contract Dyad
The status/contract distinction emerged from classical legal theory in the 19th century,6 but this meaning of status has its roots
in even older social structures. In Blackstone's Commentaries, he discusses four classic status pairs: master/servant, husband/
wife, parent/child, and guardian/ward. 7 The individuals within these pairs existed in status relationships that marked them
as “highly particular social beings” whose rights and duties with respect to those around them were defined by their status
classifications.8 In 19th century legal thought, the concept of status was further refined, and status was formulated as the
opposite of contract. Status relationships were constituted as prescribed packages of rights and obligations, while contract
relationships were constructed as bargained-for interactions, reflecting the free will of the individual contracting parties.9
The traditional historical narrative posits that, with the advent of the modern era, status ceased to be the dominant relational form
and was gradually replaced by contract.10 As Henry Sumner Maine famously explained, “the movement of the progressive
societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.” 11 For Maine, this movement was characterized by “the
gradual dissolution of family dependency, and the growth of individual obligation in its place.” 12 There was a normative
valence in this movement from status to contract--status was associated with less developed, foreign societies,13 while contract
was associated with free will and individualism. 14 While numerous scholars have taken issue  *61  with Maine's account of
history, the concept of status progressing forward to contract still maintains a strong hold on the societal imagination.15
Despite the tendency to see history as a progressive march towards contract, marriage itself occupies a problematic place within
the advancement from status to contract. Maine himself struggled with the classification of marriage when he explained that
“[t]he status of the Female under Tutelage, if the tutelage be understood of persons other than her husband, has also ceased to
exist; from her coming of age to her marriage all the relations she may form are relations of contract.” 16 Women were only
free from status when they existed outside of a marriage relationship. Despite Maine's desire to show that Western society had
ascended to a purely contractual level, he was forced to concede that married women were prohibited from contract and thus
existed in a status relationship within the family.17
Part of Maine's theoretical problem stemmed from the institution of coverture. Today, with the end of coverture (and the advent
of no-fault divorce and pre-nuptial agreements), it is easier to view married women as part of a contractual relationship and the
institution of marriage as contractual, rather than status-based.18 This interpretation is a far cry from that of 19th century jurists,
who were adamant in their classification of marriage as status. 19 The Supreme Court in Maynard v. Hill 20 expounded  *62
upon this distinction when it determined that marriage was a status-based, not contractual, institution. 21 The Court explained
that
[a]t common law, marriage as a status had few elements of contract about it. For instance, no other contract merged the
legal existence of the parties into one. Other distinctive elements will readily suggest themselves, which rob it of most of its
characteristics as a contract, and leave it simply as a status or institution. As such, it is not so much the result of private agreement
as of public ordination. In every enlightened government it is pre-eminently the basis of civil institutions, and thus an object of
the deepest public concern. In this light, marriage is more than a contract. It is not a mere matter of pecuniary consideration.
It is a great public institution, giving character to our whole civil polity.22
The progressive narrative of marriage holds that our society has moved far from the Maynard vision of unchanging status to a
fluid, contract-based regime.23 In reality, however, marriage is better described as a mixture of  *63  status and contract, rather
than a clearly defined movement from one state to the other. As Janet Halley argues, “marriage-as-contract is not the opposite of
marriage-as-status; these two visions of marriage-- perpetually linked to one another as alternatives--are the way we understandCONSTITUTING STATUS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE..., 33 Women's Rts. L....
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our constant, irresolvable ambivalence about individualism and altruism in this domain.”24 The pure, platonic categories of
status and contract cannot adequately describe the marriage institution in which spouses can bargain for specific rights, yet
are still bound by unalienable duties. 25 Indeed, even the categories of status and contract are not true dyadic opposites. 26
The two categories intertwine and overlap, rendering the traditional status/contract dyad highly problematic both as a historical
description and as distinct legal concepts. 27 Despite this instability, I use the status/contract  *64  framework as the basis for
my analysis of same-sex marriage because of the profound ideological impact this theory has had on legal thinking about the
institution of marriage.28
In the context of Perry and the debate over same-sex marriage, participants on both sides of the issue have emphasized the
status, rather than contractual, aspects of marriage. According to Halley, “the debate over same-sex marriage has intensified
and broadened a social commitment to think of marriage as status.”29 Goodridge v. Department of Public Health30 offers a
clear illustration of this theoretical move because the dissent and majority converge in their descriptions of marriage as a status
institution.31 In finding that there is a right to same-sex marriage under the Massachusetts Constitution, the majority explains
that “[m]arriage is not a mere contract between two parties but a legal status from which certain rights and obligations arise.”32
The dissent similarly emphasizes the status-not-contract nature of marriage: “Marriage has not been merely a contractual
arrangement for legally defining the private relationship between two individuals . . . . Rather, on an institutional level, marriage
is the ‘very basis of the whole fabric of civilized society . . . .”’33 While the majority and dissent disagree as to whether same-
sex couples can participate in marriage, they both view the social institution of marriage as a status relationship.34 The majority
may be progressive in expanding marriage to include same-sex couples, but it is conservative in defining marriage as a status,
which “is a ‘social institution of the highest importance.”’35
The Perry decision differs from Goodridge in its treatment of marriage insofar as Walker purports to operate within the status-to-
contract progressive narrative. Walker carefully rehearses the accepted historical  *65  advancement of family law, presenting
the narrative as legal findings of fact.36 He describes the ways in which the various restrictions on marriage have been removed
until the vestiges of status were stripped from the institution, leaving it as a contract between two equal individuals.37 He finds,
in Fact 23, that slaves were forbidden from marrying because they lacked the ability to consent to a contract;38 Fact 25 discusses
the end of miscegenation laws;39 Fact 26 describes the institution of coverture;40 Fact 27 finds that “[m]arriage between a
man and a woman was traditionally organized based on presumptions of a division of labor along gender lines”; 41 Fact 28
declares that “no-fault divorce . . . allowed spouses to define their own roles within a marriage”;42 and Fact 33(c) triumphantly
declares that “[t]he removal of gender inequality in marriage is now complete.”43 With each step forward, marriage is stripped
of some of its status restrictions, increasingly approaching a state of pure contract. This historical progression seems to resolve
itself by establishing marriage as a purely contractual institution, marked “as a realm of liberty for intimacy and free decision
making by the parties.”44
Given this grand historical progression, one expects Walker to present a purely contractual vision of marriage. However, he
breaks with the progressive narrative by emphasizing the status aspects of the marriage institution. The status nature of marriage
first emerges in the discussion of marriage as compared to civil unions and domestic partnerships. Walker draws on the testimony
of the plaintiffs to depict civil unions as a starkly contractual relationship. 45 According to Perry, a “domestic partnership [is]
an agreement; it is not the same as marriage.” 46 Perry's partner, Stier, opined that “domestic partnership feels like a legal
agreement between two parties that spells out responsibilities and duties. Nothing about domestic  *66  partnership indicates
the love and commitment that are inherent in marriage.”47 If marriage were truly a contractual relationship, as the progressive
historical narrative would lead us to conclude, then there would be no difference between a marriage and the “legal agreement”
of a domestic partnership. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs, and Walker, insist that the two institutions are fundamentally distinct.CONSTITUTING STATUS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE..., 33 Women's Rts. L....
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By rhetorically placing marriage in opposition to the contractual institution of domestic partnership, the opinion re-situates
marriage as the opposite of contract, thereby returning marriage to the realm of status.48
In contrast to the dry, contractualism of a domestic partnership, marriage is envisioned as a status relationship that is responsible
for the very ordering of society. As Walker describes,
[m]arriage requires two parties to give their free consent to form a relationship, which then forms the foundation of a household.
The spouses must consent to support each other and any dependents. The state regulates marriage because marriage creates
stable households, which in turn form the basis of a stable, governable populace.49
The focus on unchangeable rights and obligations (which form the bedrock of a stable society) echoes the Maynard court's
description of marriage and its classification as a legal status.50 Walker goes on to posit that despite the historical progress
of marriage, the essence of the institution (its status nature) has remained unchanged. 51 He concludes that “[t]he evidence
shows that the movement of marriage away from a gendered institution and toward an institution free from state-mandated
gender roles reflects an evolution in the understanding of gender rather than a change in marriage.” 52 Walker intimates that
there is something inherent and unchangeable in marriage that has remained consistent over history.53 This statement begs the
question: if the changes surrounding marriage have not been actual changes in marriage, what is the core unchanging nature of
the marriage institution? I propose that, for Walker, this unchanging core is the status nature of marriage, the unalterable rights
and obligations that define the spouses' roles in society. In Walker's words,
*67  [p]laintiffs seek to have the state recognize their committed relationships, and plaintiffs' relationships are consistent with
the core of the history, tradition and practice of marriage in the United States. Perry and Stier seek to be spouses; they seek
the mutual obligation and honor that attend marriage. Zarrillo and Katami seek recognition from the state that their union is “a
coming together for better or worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.”54
One of the clearest examples of marriage and domestic partnerships aligned at opposite ends of the status/contract dyad is
Walker's discussion of a 2004 change in California's domestic partnership law.55 As psychologist Gregory Herek testified,
In 2004, California enacted legislation that increased the benefits and responsibilities associated with domestic partnership,
which became effective in 2005. In the second half of 2004, the California Secretary of State mailed a letter to all registered
domestic partners advising them of the changes and telling recipients to consider whether to dissolve their partnership.56
Herek found the letter significant because it represented the way in which domestic partnerships can be readily entered and
exited, as if they were merely contractual business relationships. He contrasted the transitory contractualism of domestic
partnerships with the stable status of marriage, continuing,
[I] find[] it difficult to imagine that if there were changes in tax laws that were going to affect married couples, that you would
have the state government sending letters to people suggesting that they consider whether or not they want to get divorced
before this new law goes into effect. I think that--that letter just illustrates the way in which domestic partnerships are viewed
differently than marriage.57
*68  The key for Herek was the psychological ease with which domestic partnerships can be dissolved, as opposed to
marriage.58 By suggesting that domestic partners would readily sever their legal ties in order to avoid the burden of changes
in the law, the state was sending a message that domestic partnerships are contracts to be renegotiated or terminated whenever
external legal conditions change.59 As Herek notes, it would be considered bizarre if couples treated marriage in the same way
because marriage is not viewed in the same contractual light.60CONSTITUTING STATUS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE..., 33 Women's Rts. L....
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By focusing on Herek's example in his opinion, Walker inscribes the status/contract distinction into the law of the case,
positioning marriage as status and domestic partnership as contract. In doing so, Walker is re-inscribing value judgments that
rank marriage (status) as superior to domestic partnerships (contract). I will attempt to explain the origins of this valuation and
the ways in which hierarchy is built into the status/contract dyad in the following section.
Part II--Status as Rank
The term “status” takes on a second connotation in the discussion of marriage and domestic partnership--namely, status
understood as rank or social standing.61 Implicit in the legal comparisons between the two institutions is a judgment that one
institution (marriage) is superior to the other (domestic partnership). In this section, I will trace the origins of this judgment and
dismantle the way in which these two meanings of status intersect.
The use of status as rank in the marriage context is not unique to Perry; this meaning can be found in other cases discussing
the issue of same-sex marriage. Goodridge touched briefly on the issue of status/rank when the majority noted “[m]arriage also
bestows enormous private and social advantages on those who choose to marry.”62 While the court goes on to list the specific
legal advantages of marriage, the inclusion of “social advantages” points to the high-ranking position that marriage holds in
*69  society.63 By this, I mean not just that people care about marriage as an abstract institution, but that married couples are
afforded a degree of social standing and rank by virtue of their marriage. Goodridge's companion case, In re Opinions of the
Justices to the Senate, spoke more directly to the social status inherent in marriage:
The bill's [providing civil unions for same-sex partners] absolute prohibition of the use of the word
“marriage” by “spouses” who are the same sex is more than semantic. The dissimilitude between the terms
“civil marriage” and “civil union” is not innocuous; it is a considered choice of language that reflects a
demonstrable assigning of same-sex, largely homosexual couples to second-class status.64
This opinion asserts that couples who are relegated to civil unions are living in a “second-class,” albeit contractual relationship,
whereas married couples are given the social status of existing within a status relationship.65 Put in these terms, the fight over
same-sex marriage is recast as a struggle to move queer individuals from second-class to first-class status, by granting them
access to the institution of marriage.
This language of first- and second-class status is frequently invoked within the Perry decision. As psychologist Letitia Peplau
testified, marriage is “the first class kind of relationship in this country . . . the status of relationship[] that this society most
values, most esteems, considers the most legitimate and the most appropriate.”66 Similarly, economist Lee Badgett testified
that society sees domestic partnerships as “second class status.”67 Walker incorporates this reasoning into his findings of fact,
declaring “domestic partnership does not provide gays and lesbians with a status equivalent to marriage because the cultural
meaning of marriage and its associated benefits are intentionally withheld from same-sex couples in domestic partnerships.”68
Domestic partnerships, precisely because they denote a lower social status, are less desirable because they are “not something
that is necessarily understood or recognized by other people in [one's own] environment.”69
*70  On some level, it seems natural to classify marriage as superior and domestic partnerships as inferior or second-class,
and it is the very ease of this classification that I wish to examine. If, as Maine proposed, enlightened societies advance from
status to contract,70 why should the status relationship (marriage) be more socially desirable? Is it not true that the more purely
contractual relationship should be valued precisely because it reflects the free will and reason of the individual actors? I propose
that part of the social preference at work here is due to the history of the status relationship itself. Consider the classic status
pairs from Blackstone: king/commoner, master/slave, husband/wife. 71 Not only do these status relationships define differentCONSTITUTING STATUS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE..., 33 Women's Rts. L....
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bundles of rights and obligations between parties, they are also designations of rank or social class. In each pairing, one-half
of the dyad occupies a socially superior position in relation to the other. The king is ranked above the commoner, the master
above the slave, and the husband above the wife.72
The connection between status as a legal package of rights and obligations and status as rank is connected both etymologically
and historically: the same word designates both meanings, and the classic status relationships were crucial designators of
standing in society.73 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, status is defined as “[t]he legal standing or position of a
person as determined by his membership of some class of persons legally enjoying certain rights or subject to certain limitations;
condition in respect, e.g., of liberty or servitude, marriage or celibacy, infancy or majority.” 74 A second definition pertains
more closely to rank: “[p]osition or standing in society, a profession, and the like.” 75 While these two definitions can be
categorized as legal and social, respectively, it is impossible to fully sever the one from the other. The legal position is a  *71
function of the position in society (whether liberty or servitude, marriage or celibacy) and the social position is dependent on
legal rights and entitlements. This reflexive relationship between legal status and social status causes us to implicitly rank one
position as higher than the other when faced with both halves of a status relationship.
The connection between legal status and rank means that we are accustomed to seeing status pairs and creating a hierarchy
between the two positions. When faced with the pair of marriage/domestic partnership, we comfortably ascribe superiority to
the one and inferiority to the other. However, marriage and domestic partnership, while two related institutions, do not make up
a true status relationship like king/commoner or master/slave. In a traditional status dyad, both sides of the pair have rights and
obligations to each other, and it is that particular bundle of responsibilities that defines the nature of the relationship. Marriage
and domestic partnership have no rights or obligations to each other as institutions; rather they themselves designate rights and
obligations for the couples within their purview. A husband can have rights and obligations to a wife, but marriage, as an abstract
institution, cannot have rights and obligations to another institution, like domestic partnership. Halley suggests that we tend to
see marriage in relation to the state of singleness, proposing that married/single could function as a status dyad.76 Nevertheless,
as Halley points out, there is no mutual obligation between married people and single people. 77 While the individuals inside
of marriage may exist within a status, and marriage as an institution can be a status, marriage itself does not exist in a status
relationship with another legal institution.
Despite the fact that marriage/domestic partnership is a false status dyad, the deep-rooted concept of status relationships and the
overloading of the status term causes us to project rankings onto these abstract categories. The words labeling the two institutions
take on status attributes, and we see them as existing in a hierarchical relationship with each other. As Suzanne Kim describes,
“[t]oday's discussion of legal prohibition of same-sex marriage rests on the belief that language, in the form of names and labels,
is deeply meaningful from a status perspective.” 78 Kim argues that the language we use to discuss and differentiate marriage
and domestic  *72  partnerships actually reifies and (re)creates the hierarchical distinction; “language practices (for example,
selecting different terminology), particularly when used by the state, have direct status consequences.” 79 Once these terms
have been imbued with markers of social status, “[a] state-enforced difference in terminology such as that between ‘marriage’
and ‘civil union’ affects same-sex couples' status because it both reflects and reinforces their marginalized status relative to
opposite-sex couples.”80 According to Kim, merely having two separate terms for the same thing causes us to rank those terms
and create social hierarchy.81
While I agree with Kim that the linguistic pairing of marriage and domestic partnership is to some degree responsible for the
hierarchical ranking of the two institutions, I think there are other forces at work. In addition to the structural practice of ranking
the two halves of a status pair, I would argue that the ranking of marriage and domestic partnership reflects a societal preference
for status over contract. In Perry, time and again, the status qualities of marriage are emphasized and valued as desirable. For
example, Fact 60(b) points out thatCONSTITUTING STATUS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE..., 33 Women's Rts. L....
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[m]any Dutch couples saw marriage as better because it had an additional social meaning that registered partnership, as a recent
political invention, lacked . . . . In some places, the cultural and political trappings of statuses that are not marriage send a very
clear message of difference and inferiority to gay and lesbian couples.82
The thing that makes marriage “better” than a domestic partnership is its “cultural and political trappings”; 83 in other words,
the status nature of marriage. Culturally, marriage is critical in defining a person's role in society because it is viewed as a status
relationship, a fundamental relationship that establishes a person's social role, rights, and responsibilities. Domestic partnership
is seen as a contract that does not carry with it the same embedded social message. The status “trappings” of marriage then
become the sought-after marker of social superiority. This preference for status (marriage) over contract (domestic partnership)
harkens back to Maynard v. Hill, when status relationships were held out as the pinnacle of social achievement. 84 Status
relationships are described as  *73  simply more desirable than and superior to contractual ones, and to deny a person access
to legal status is to relegate him or her to an inferior social status.
While it may be normatively problematic to claim as legal fact that marriage is socially superior to domestic partnership, I
contend that such a ranking was crucial to Walker's finding that Proposition 8 was a violation of substantive due process.
The hierarchical distinction is necessary because proponents of Proposition 8 argued that same-sex couples were not actually
denied access to the fundamental right of marriage85 due to the fact that same-sex couples were provided with the institution of
domestic partnership as an equal substitute.86 In order to find a violation of substantive due process, the court had to hold that
domestic partnership, while legally equal to marriage, was not an adequate replacement for it. The hierarchical ranking of the
two institutions becomes the lynch pin in the due process argument because it is the only means of distinguishing the otherwise
legally identical87 institutions. Walker relies on social status as a way of distinguishing domestic partnership from marriage:
The evidence shows that domestic partnerships do not fulfill California's due process obligation to plaintiffs
for two reasons. First, domestic partnerships are distinct from marriage and do not provide the same social
meaning as marriage. Second, domestic partnerships were created specifically so that California could offer
same-sex couples rights and benefits while explicitly withholding marriage from same-sex couples.88
The “social meaning” that domestic partnerships fail to provide is the social superiority of a status relationship. Walker
concludes that domestic partnership cannot be an adequate substitute for marriage because  *74  “marriage is a culturally
superior status compared to a domestic partnership.”89 An “inferior institution,” like domestic partnership, is not enough to
meet the state's “due process obligation to allow plaintiffs to marry.” 90 The language of the opinion reinforces and re-enacts
the ranking of the two institutions in order to engage in this due process analysis. 91 In extending the right to marry to same-
sex couples, Perry entrenches marriage's position as the most desirable and superior social institution.
Part III--The Status/Conduct Dyad
A third meaning of status that lurks in the background of Perry is status as part of the status/conduct dyad. This variation of
status is most commonly used in the debate surrounding Don't Ask, Don't Tell,92 which was ostensibly established to prevent
homosexual conduct, not homosexual status, in the military.93 Used in this context, status is defined as identity or essence, in
contrast to conduct or actions. There is only one explicit allusion to this kind of status in Perry. In his discussion of the Equal
Protection Clause, Walker explains, “[h]omosexual conduct and identity together define what it means to be gay or lesbian,”94
and he cites to Christian Legal Society v. Martinez 95 for the proposition that Supreme Court “decisions have declined to
distinguish between status and conduct in [the context of sexual orientation].” 96 While this is the only mention of status asCONSTITUTING STATUS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE..., 33 Women's Rts. L....
 © 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 8
sexual identity in Perry, I contend that this form of status is present throughout the opinion and is integral to creating a particular
vision of homosexuality.
Many of Walker's findings of fact are devoted to establishing the exact nature of sexual orientation. Fact 43 avers,
*75  Sexual orientation refers to an enduring pattern of sexual, affectional or romantic desires for and attractions to men,
women, or both sexes. An individual's sexual orientation can be expressed through self-identification, behavior or attraction.
The vast majority of people are consistent in self-identification, behavior and attraction throughout their adult lives.97
While Walker begins by describing sexual orientation in terms of conduct (the feelings and desires expressed and acted upon),
he quickly switches to terms of status and identity (like “consistent in self-identification”). 98 Homosexual status is described
as something inherent and unchanging, 99 essential to a person's definition of self. As Fact 44 concludes, “Sexual orientation
is commonly discussed as a characteristic of the individual. Sexual orientation is fundamental to a person's identity.” 100 In
addition, many of the factual findings are devoted to refuting the proposition that sexual orientation is changeable or socially
constructed. For example, Walker cites as fact Ilan Meyer's testimony that “[s]exual orientation is perceived as ‘a core thing
about who you are.’ People say: ‘This is who I am. [I]t is a central identity that is important.”’ 101 Walker also stresses the
plaintiffs' assertions that they were “born” gay and that their orientations are fixed and unchanging.102 The implication of
this testimony is that homosexuality is primarily status-based; it is an inborn characteristic, and an individual's conduct will
naturally comport with this innate status.103
The vision of homosexuality put forth in Perry mirrors the essentialist theory of sexuality, which posits that sexuality is
biologically created, rather than socially or culturally constructed. As Janet Halley describes the two positions,
an essentialist view of homosexual orientation claims that it is a deep-rooted, fixed, and intrinsic feature of individuals.
This essentialist view assumes that homosexual orientation is determined (by nature or nurture), not chosen . . . .  *76  The
constructivist view of homosexual orientation claims that it is a contingent, socially malleable trait that arises in a person as
she manages her world, its meanings, and her desires.104
The essentialist view is closely linked to the idea of status, the idea that sexual orientation is something innate inside the self
that does not depend on social or cultural interaction for its creation. 105 The essentialist/constructivist divide is similar to the
status/conduct dyad in that essentialism posits that sexual orientation is part of identity, an essential component of a person
that cannot be changed. In this sense, sexual identity is status: who a person is, as opposed to what a person does (conduct).
Walker's findings of fact lean heavily toward the essentialist view. While Walker does not commit to strong essentialism, 106
he decidedly rejects the proponents' contentions that sexual orientation is a social construction (i.e. the constructivist view).
For example, Fact 46 establishes that “[i]ndividuals do not generally choose their sexual orientation. No credible evidence
supports a finding that an individual may, through conscious decision, therapeutic intervention or any other method, change his
or her sexual orientation.” 107 Social constructivism is briefly considered and dismissed when Walker accepts as fact Herek's
disapproval of the theory.108
The debate between constructivism and essentialism has important implications for equal protection litigation. One of the
concerns in an equal protection case is the ability to categorize the disadvantaged group as a  *77  legally cognizable class.109
As Suzanne Goldberg explains, “In the equal protection context, this means that a plaintiff must show that the government has
drawn an impermissible, injurious classification based on a trait he or she possesses.” 110 One defense to an equal protection
challenge is to assert that the trait does not exist in the first place or that it cannot be used to create a defined class of individuals.
The proponents of Proposition 8 launched just such an attack when they asserted “that sexual orientation cannot be defined.”111CONSTITUTING STATUS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE..., 33 Women's Rts. L....
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Essentially, the proponents were asserting a constructionist position by arguing that sexual orientation was so changeable and
culturally contingent that there was no way to define a class of persons who possessed the trait of “homosexuality.”112
In  an  interesting  twist,  this  puts  defenders  of  anti-gay  policies  in  the  traditionally  liberal  theoretical  position  of  social
constructivism.113 In contrast, litigators arguing for gay rights tend to argue that sexual orientation is biological and immutable
in order to emphasize the fixed and discrete nature of the disadvantaged group. 114 Goldberg contends that judges are more
comfortable with the essentialist theory that sexuality is a natural, unchanging fact, because it relieves courts of the responsibility
of defining the trait for themselves:
*78  By overtly allowing for the possibility that the meaning and significance of a trait may change over
time or vary among individuals, either because society changes or because individuals experience the trait
differently, both theories [anti-essentialism and social constructivism] reject the existence of an absolute,
fixed trait definition. This position, in turn, affects adjudication of trait-based anti-discrimination claims
because it puts front and center the court's role in defining a trait's contours. In contrast, theories such as
essentialism that disregard society's role in defining a trait or discount [how] variations among trait-bearers
shape a trait's definition leave courts in the seemingly passive position of receiving a trait definition that
is mandated or derived from “nature.”115
By framing a trait as already defined by nature, a court can accept the category as ready-made and avoid the criticism of
having actively created a new categorization.116 Gay rights lawyers who accept this strategy are then forced to portray sexual
orientation as a biologically driven, inherent characteristic, a theory that many find highly problematic. 117 Even if gay rights
litigators wanted to present a more nuanced, weak constructivist view of sexuality, Goldberg worries that “judicial reluctance to
define personal traits may limit the effectiveness of anti-essentialist and social construction arguments in assisting courts to reach
accurate, non-simplistic understandings of identity-based discrimination.”118 There is a sense that a simple, biologically based
understanding of sexual orientation is necessary in order to establish the existence of a class in an equal protection claim.119
Put in terms of status and conduct, there is a strong presumption that equal protection litigation can only protect gay rights if
homosexuality is framed as status, not conduct. Seen as an innate status, homosexuality is an easily definable class that is marked
by inherent characteristics possessed by a discrete population. When homosexuality is defined as conduct, however, the bounds
of the class are set in flux. Such awkward questions arise as: is a person within this class if he or she performs one same-sex
sex act, or must a person be a repeat player to fit within the bounds? In the context of Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Janet Halley writes
that Hardwick and its  *79  progeny “set up a dichotomy: gay plaintiffs would almost certainly lose when courts concluded
that discrimination against them was based on disapproval of their sodomitical conduct, and they might well win when courts
concluded that discrimination was based ‘merely’ on their status.” 120 While this distinction is based in part on the fact that,
until Lawrence, homosexual conduct was a permissible ground for discrimination, the distinction also relies on an essentialist
construction of status. This status-based construction is troubling because it focuses too narrowly on the metaphysical essence
of an individual and disallows any space for free will or individual action:
[T]he  assumption  [is]  that  homosexuality,  as  a  status,  pre-exists  legal  ascription  and  will  remain
metaphysically the same whether the law recognizes it or not. This claim--that the law does not make
homosexuals and in fact can entirely ignore them--rests on an implicit reification of sexual orientation as a
form of personhood. Homosexual orientation is represented as status in the sense that it is a type of personal
character that inheres so deeply within a person that it constitutes a pervasive personal essence. Sexual-
orientation status on this model is both real and intrinsic to individuals: it is not the nominal product of its
apperception or a product of interaction among individuals. Sexual orientation as status is constituted in and
as a secret inner core of personhood; thus it is not constituted in relationship, interaction, or representation.
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In  accepting  the  plaintiffs'  claim  of  discrimination  based  on  innate  sexual  orientation,  Walker  implicitly  defines  sexual
orientation as status, not conduct. While this led to a legal victory for gay rights, the decision must still be scrutinized as part of
the larger legal and theoretical landscape. Perry comes down on the side of essentialism and hints towards a strong biological
basis, thereby belying any notion that culture, choice, or conduct play a role in the construction of sexuality. The decision is
troubling insomuch as a court is making authoritative findings of fact about a question that is both widely debated and deeply
personal. When equal protection is decided on status grounds, does it foreclose the possibility of protection for individuals who
view their acts as freely chosen and not biologically ordained? Going forward, how does this fixation on status affect both
the conception of the self and human sexuality and the available protection for individuals who live and view their lives as
social constructs?
*80  Conclusion
Throughout this paper, I have traced the ways in which status is referenced and valued throughout the text of Perry v.
Schwarzenegger.122 In each of the three sections, I have discussed the ways in which status was positioned as part of three
different pairs, always holding an oppositional place in relation to another concept. Status is constituted as the opposite of
contract; it is attached to marriage as hierarchically superior to domestic partnership, and it is contrasted with conduct in
the essentialism/constructivism debate. In these three relationships, none of which make up true theoretical dyads, status is
consistently framed as an oppositional value, operating in contrast to and in tension with its ideological counterpart. Each time
the court is asked to make a choice between the two halves of the dyad, it evinces a strong social and judicial preference for
status. The concept is overloaded with different meanings, but all those meanings converge in their desirability and superiority.
Marriage is constituted as a status, not contractual, relationship, and it is this legal status that gives it social status (rank). Social
status (or the lack thereof), in turn, allows the court to define domestic partnership as an insufficient substitute for the status of
marriage. The status (state) of the plaintiffs as queer is understood in terms of their status (identity or essence) rather than their
conduct in order to reify their status (position) as a discrete, disadvantaged class. Status both underlies and motivates the judicial
decision; it is invoked as part of the doctrine of due process and equal protection and it operates normatively as a descriptor of
social values. I do not contend that the decision self-consciously relies on these status concepts, but rather that the use of status
reflects a broader social and cultural trend. The debate over same-sex marriage has reaffirmed the ascendency of status in every
meaning of the term. As I have shown, this return to status can be found in the writings of judges, academics, psychologists, and
the broader population.123 It is the incorporation of these many voices into the factual findings of Perry that establishes status
as a profoundly important and multi-dimensional cultural concept. However, just as Perry picks up on social preferences, it also
plays a role in shaping the preference itself. The decision memorializes and legitimates these valuations of status, recreating the
superiority of status by inscribing it in the legal record.124 The judicial findings of fact (that marriage is a status, that marriage
has superior status, and that homosexuality is a status)  *81  set forth in Perry will be used and reused, integrated into the social
fabric, gradually becoming markers in yet another chapter in the progressive (or regressive) narrative of status.
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